Europe-China: Sense and Sensibility

di: Francesco Sisci

eu-cina

This year, 2024, may mark a significant shift in the relationship between the European Union (EU) and China. The February 2022 shock of China’s support for Russia against Ukraine was compounded by the potentially even greater shock of China’s stance on Israel and its support for Iran in the Middle East. This has created a substantial divide in the perspectives and sensitivities between the two major poles of the Eurasian continent.

The newly more right-leaning European Parliament has passed recent decisions on tariffs on Chinese imports with relative ease due to this change in sentiment. Before the wars, tariffs on Chinese exports were more controversial. The divergence in approaches and perceptions between the EU and China regarding global developments makes finding common ground on trade even more challenging.

The response to Trump’s announcement of new tariffs against the EU led ECB chair Christine Lagarde to appeal to Europeans to buy more American products to counteract perceived US “hostile” intentions towards the EU. Conversely, Beijing believed US tariffs could help the EU and China find common ground against the US. An article in the South China Morning Post called for a China-EU “United Front” against US tariffs[1]. Still, the appeal fell on deaf EU ears. Europeans don’t want to provoke further US hostility and want to find common ground with the US, a fundamental ally in Ukraine and the Middle East.

The Chinese appeal misses the point.

With or without tariffs, the convergence of sensitivity between the US and the EU due to wars and perceived common threats is more pronounced than it has been since the end of the Cold War. Since the Cold War ended, the US and Europe grew distant from each other due to issues like currency debates over the euro and varying involvement in wars and uprisings in Central Asia and the Middle East. American military actions, such as in the Gulf, extended interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the sudden withdrawal from Afghanistan strained US-European relations. Now, the trend is reversing.

Regardless of tariffs, if China does not recognize and address the differing sensitivities with the EU, relations could worsen across all political arenas. There is no longer a strong push in the EU to “better understand” China. China is now seen mainly as a key factor contributing to Germany’s and the EU’s current economic doldrums and challenges.

China should approach the situation differently. Deteriorating relations with the EU exacerbate China’s issues with the US, and the other way around, it is in a vicious circle. Beijing needs a new, comprehensive strategy. This strategy could begin by asking two fundamental questions: What does the EU desire from its relationship with the US? What does China hope to achieve in its interaction with the US?

Russia

The Russia problem remains another significant issue. Even if Trump manages to broker a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin next year, Moscow will continue to pose a threat and challenge to Europe, and there’s no return to the past. After three decades of peace, the war has demonstrated that Russia remains a historical threat to Europe. Therefore, Europe must be prepared to confront Russia in the future, whether in five or forty years, depending on the outcome of the peace deal. If Russia disintegrates post-peace, the EU military should be ready to handle the potential chaos from the Russian fallout.

Moreover, the idea that Russia might turn against China, as some US pundits hoped for, could fail to materialize. “The first task is to reject neat but fanciful solutions. Some in recent years have imagined a grand diplomatic move that would flip Russia to the United States side in its competition with China,” argued Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine[2].

Yes, as the authors explain, the EU is facing what three decades ago, former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski warned was “Potentially, the most dangerous scenario… be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an ‘anti-hegemonic’ coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. It would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower this time.”[3]

The alliance did indeed emerge, but the ongoing two-front uncoordinated war is also crippling it.

Assad in Syria fell, and now Russia’s projection in the Mediterranean Sea through the Tartus Port is in jeopardy. Moreover, the regime in Tehran, after losing three precious proxies (Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Assad in Syria), is trembling.

This all goes back to Beijing. What does China want: be drawn into conflicts it apparently doesn’t understand and certainly can’t control or find a way out?

Precisely 400 years ago, in the 1620s, Ming China was facing the Spanish-Portuguese challenge. The export of porcelain and silk enriched China, but the Ming refused to open their market for the reasons of global commerce. The dynasty fell two decades after that. Exactly 200 years later, in the 1820s, Qing China faced a similar situation. The export was tea this time, but similarly, China refused to balance its trade. Two decades after the Opium War broke out, the dynasty was shattered and eventually fell.

In the 2020s, what will happen as the People’s Republic of China is embroiled in two impossible wars and almost unmanageable trade and border issues? Can history escape the cycle? Perhaps these are the recurring questions hammering Beijing these days.